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PREEMPTION RECONSIDERED: THE APPARENT 
REAFFIRMATION OF GARN!ON 
HOWARD LESNICK* 
INTRODUCTION 
It is a rare pleasure to be given the opportunity to participate in this 
way in honoring Judge Hays. I will leave to others any expression of thoughts 
regarding his overall contributions to the law, to the Columbia Law School 
or, indeed, to the larger society ; for myself, I recall him as a wise and gentle 
teacher, who contributed as much as anyone on the faculty to the reinforcement 
of my desire to study, practice and teach law-in particular, labor law. 
It is entirely appropriate to use this occasion to examine the continuing 
evolution of the "preemption" doctrine. 1 Many who received their legal educa­
tion at Columbia fifteen to twenty-five years ago will recall that one of 
Professor Hays' most prescient insights was his early recognition that the 
Taft-Hartley amendments 2 would have perhaps their greatest impact in a 
totally unanticipated and, in a sense, perverse way. He referred to the 1947 
Act as the Magna Carta of the labor movement; what he meant-if one can 
credit a former student's recollection long after his class notes have been 
forever mislaid-was that the statute would ultimately free unions from the 
restrictions of state law and state courts, and that such a result would prove 
far more significant than the limited strictures newly enacted into federal law. 
I. FRO:t>I Garmon TO Lockr1:dge 
To a substantial degree such has indeed been the denouement, although 
in a very episodic and uncertain way. To speak very generally, the period until 
the 1959 decision in San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon3 was one of 
great vacillation, as the Court groped for an acceptable response. Some deci­
sions suggested broad-ranging preemptive rationales ;4 others emphasized the 
preclusive effect of federal law on state power, but on more limited grounds ;5 
still others manifested a great reluctance to find in Taft-Hartley any meaning­
ful interference with state regulation. 6 Garmon appeared to resolve this un-
* Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. This article is based on a paper 
delivered at the Eighteenth Annual Institute on Labor Law of the Southwestern Legal 
Foundation. Dallas, Texas, published in the Proceedings of the Institute by Matthew 
Bender & Co., Inc. 
1. The "preemption" doctrine deals with the effect of federal law on state regulation 
of labor-management relations. 
2. Pub. L. No. 80-101, 6 1  Stat. 136 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1 4 1  et seq. 
(1970)). 
3. 359 U.S. 236 (1959). 
4. E.g., Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485 (1953). 
5. E.g., Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1 955). 
6. E.g., International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617  (1958) · Inter­
national Union, UA \V v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1
'
949). 
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certainty. Arising on review of a state court judgment against minority-union 
picketing for recognition and a closed shop, the decision reflected a commit­
ment-albeit by a bare majority of the justices-to an expansive concept of 
preemption. Specifically, it set to rest the contention that state law could 
supplement federal remedies and strongly espoused what one might call a 
"primary jurisdiction" rationale for preemption: 
When it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the activities which a 
State purports to regulate are protected by § 7 of the National Labor 
Relations Act, or constitute an unfair labor practice under § 8, clue 
regard for the federal enactment requires that state jurisdiction must 
yield . ... When an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the 
Act, the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclu­
sive competence of the National Labor Relations Board .... 7 
The decade following witnessed a consolidation of the mandate of Garmon 
and an articulation of the scope and limits of its principles, but the sense of 
vacillation persisted. There was strong fidelity to its core concept of discour­
aging state regulation of strikes, boycotts and picketing,8 and state court 
resistance to preemption appeared to ease, thereby lessening the need for active 
Supreme Court involvement in the area.9 At the same time, a series of new 
issues arose which the Court consistently distinguished from Garmon ;10 
some of these issues were important, others rather trivial, but the impression 
grew that the Court was retrenching. This feeling was crystallized in 1970 
by the call, from within the Court, for reexamination and narrowing of the 
preemption doctrine.U With a substantial minority of the justices j oining in 
7. 359 U.S. at 244-45. 
8. See, e.g., Teamsters Local 20 v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252 (1964); Marine Eng'rs 
Benevolent Ass'n v. Interlake S.S. Co., 370 U.S. 173 (1962) ; cf. Brotherhood of R.R. 
Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369 (1969). 
9. A contributing factor was doubtless the enactment, in the same year as the Garmon 
decision, of new federal legislative restrictions on organizational picketing and secondary 
boycotts. Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 541 (1959), amending 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. 
(1970) . While the reception accorded these provisions by the Board and the courts has 
generated continuing controversy, it is clear that they provide some significant employer 
access to a federal remedy for practices that formerly could be proceeded against only 
in state courts. 
10. E.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967) (fair representation); Linn v. United 
Plant Guard Workers, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966) (defamation); Carey v. Westing­
house Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964) (arbitration); Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 
371 U.S. 195 (1962) (breach of contract). 
11. Taggart v. Weinacker's, Inc., 397 U.S. 223 ( 1970), involved the picketing of a 
retail store on a portion of sidewalk that was privately owned. The Court did not de­
cide the case (raising preemption and First Amendment issues) on the merits. In con­
curring in the dismissal of the writ of certiorari, Chief Justice Burger volunteered his 
view that the Court should assimilate "trespass" to the body of decisions allowing 
states to regulate violence and defamation. I d. at 228. In International Longshoremen's 
Ass'n, Local 1416 v. Ariadne Shipping Co., 397 U.S. 195 (1970), the Court routinely 
reversed a state-court injunction against the picketing of a foreign-flag ship which used 
American longshoremen to load the vessel. Justice 'vVhite with the concurrence of 
Justices Stewart and Burger, urged that state power shoul�l not be preempted simply 
because the uni?n conduct was "arguably" protected; the state court should be pre­
cluded from actmg only if it (or the Supreme Court on direct review) would hold that 
the action complained of was "actually" protected. I d. at 202. 
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the expression of skeptical views, real doubts >vere generated whether Garmon 
would survive the imminent reexamination. 
In Amalgmnated Ass'n of Street Ry. Employees v. Lockridge,l2 pre­
emption made a goal-line stand, and held: Garmon lives (four justices dis­
senting) ! Lockridge was one of a number of Greyhound drivers, employed 
under a union-security agreement, who revoked their check-off authorizations 
and promptly forgot to pay their union dues directly at the first of the month. 
The union constitution was a curious one. It provided that a member lost his 
good standing but remained a member if the clues were not paid by the 
fifteenth of the month in which they were due; and that he was deemed 
suspended from membership if they were not paid by the end of the next 
month. But it also stipulated that, if an applicable collective bargaining agree­
ment required the maintenance of membership in good standing as a condition 
of employment, a member might be suspended from membership (and dis­
charged) after only one month. The Greyhound agreement simply required 
continued membership, rather than membership in good standing; neverthe­
less, the union treasurer erroneously notified Lockridge of his suspension 
from membership when he was in arrears one day beyond one month, simul­
taneously advising Greyhound of the action and requesting that Lockridge 
be discharged. Lockridge was away on vacation when the suspension notice 
arrived, and his wife immediately tendered a check for two months' dues, 
which was refused. Greyhound removed Lockridge from the payroll promptly 
after receiving the notice of suspension. 
No labor lawyer would feel uncomfortable arguing in support of a charge 
of unfair labor practices on these facts. Discharge could lawfully be sought 
or implemented under the National Labor Relations Act only if Lockridge's 
membership was terminated because of his "failure to tender the periodic 
dues ... uniformly required as a condition of ... retaining membership .... "13 
But Lockridge had not yet failed to tender the dues required to retain member­
ship, and had simply lost his good standing. Moreover, the circumstances 
reek of suspicion that the delinquency was merely a pretext, that "the Union 
insisted on what it thought was a technically valid position because it was 
piqued by Lockridge's obtaining his release from the checkof£."14 Nevertheless, 
Lockridge did not file charges with the NLRB. Perhaps his failure to do so 
resulted from the Board's dismissal of charges filed by a fellow employee 
similarly suspended from membership and discharged. The regional director 
had there refused to issue a complaint, giving only the boilerplate ground 
that "there is insufficient evidence of violations . . . .  "15 Nearly a year after 
12. 403 U.S. 274 (1971). 
1 3. 29 U.S.C. § ISS(b) (2) (1970). See id. at§ ISS(a) (3 ) .  
14. 403 U.S. at 280. The Court so characterized the "likely" facts in the absence of 
formal findings by the trial court. 
' 
15. I d. at 280 n.3. Review by the General Counsel was not sought. 
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the regional director's refusal, Lockridge brought suit against the union in 
state court and recovered a judgment reinstating him to membership and 
awarding him over $30,000 in lost pay. 
Speaking for a five-man majority, Justice Harlan characterized the case 
as a "routine and simple"16 one for preemption; but, recognizing the "under­
standable confusion, perhaps in a measure attributable to the previous opinions 
of this Court, ... over the jurisprudential bases"17 of Garmon, he thought it 
appropriate to write at length. Rather than attempt here a summary of the 
analyses of Court and dissenters, I prefer to draw on them as appropriate in 
the context of  the thesis that I would like to present: Lockridge makes clear 
that the time has long since come to eschew entirely the traditional "primary 
jurisdiction" rationale implicit in the "protected or prohibited" aphorism which 
has served as the guiding wisdom in the area. 
II. THE "PRIMARY JuRISDICTION" RATIONALE 
The traditional approach may be stated in these terms: ( 1) If conduct 
is protected under section 718 or prohibited under section 8,19 there is pre­
emption because federal law regulates the conduct and concurrent state regula­
tion is not permitted; (2) if the conduct is neither protected nor prohibited, 
there is no preemption because the conduct is not federally regulated ; but ( 3) 
if the conduct is "arguably" protected or prohibited, there is preemption 
because only the NLRB (subject to appellate review) can adjudicate questions 
under the Act, and thus determine whether the conduct in fact falls within 
proposition 1 or proposition 2. 2 0 
A. ({Arguably Protected}): The Irrelevance of Section 7 
Virtually every aspect of this rubric is analytically disquieting, doctrinally 
misleading, or both. Thus-to begin with the "arguably protected" category­
on what basis can the law hold not only that federal rights may be asserted 
defensively in a suit based on state law, 2 1  but that the state court may not 
then decide whether there is merit in the assertion? It has always seemed 
fairly evident to me (and, I would guess, to most labor lawyers )  that the real 
reason for this position is nothing more nor less than a pervasive mistrust of 
state court fact-finding and law-finding processes in labor cases. Such cynicism 
would be well warranted by history, but judicial acceptance of its implications 
would be rather startling, and one would not expect to find explicit Supreme 
Court ratio in support of such a position. 
16. I d. at 282. 
17. Id. at 285. 
18. 29 u.s.c. § 157 (1970). 
19. 29 u.s.c. § 158 (1970). 
20. See, e.g., C. MoRRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw 788-93 (1971). 
21. All agree that if union conduct is "actually protected," state law may not make 
it actionable. 
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One can, of course, shift the focus from the failings of state law in pro­
tecting federal rights to the inadequacies of Supreme Court certiorari review 
to meet the problem. From that perspective our traditional notion that the 
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court safeguards the vindication of 
federal law in state courts is perceived to fail us. Justice Harlan said as much 
in Lockridge: 
Nor can we proceed on a case-by-case basis to determine whether 
each particular final judicial pronouncement does, or might reason­
ably be thought to, conflict in some relevant manner with federal 
labor policy. This Court is ill-equipped to play such a role and the 
federal system dictates that this problem be solved with a rule capable 
of relatively easy application, so that lower courts may largely police 
themselves in this regard. 22 
But surely more needs to be said. In other instances in which it is thought 
appropriate to assure a litigant a federal forum for the trial of issues of federal 
law-the removal jurisdiction of the district courts is probably the most 
common example23-a federal forum is in fact provided. But a union seeking 
to abort a state-court proceeding on the ground that federal law "arguably" 
protects its conduct need not invoke a federal tribunal, whether by removal or 
otherwise. Indeed, the employer may not, on his own initiative, present to 
federal adjudicators his contention that the conduct is not protected, for the 
NLRB (the sole initial expositor of rights under the Act) has no substantive 
declaratory-judgment jurisdiction. 24 The question whether conduct is unpro­
tected is faced by the Board only in proceedings against employers, when an 
allegedly illegal discharge is sought to be justified on the ground that the con­
duct for which the employee was discharged was not protected under section 7. 
In my judgment, such difficulties bespeak the irrelevance of section 7, 
and the concept of protected and unprotected conduct, to the preemption prob­
lem. To say that an act is protected under section 7 is to say that an employer 
commits an unfair labor practice by punishing or threatening an employee for 
engaging in such an act. The issue cannot even be framed in most cases of 
picketing-as in organizing situations or many varieties of secondary boy­
cotts-where "strangers" to the employer are involved. Of course the Court 
has held since Hill v. Florida25 that the rights conferred by section 7 mav be 
asserted against state regulation as well as against employer discipline. But 
(to take the setting of Ariadne as an example) 26 were a state to provide by 
statute that no union may picket a foreign-flag ship in any port within the 
22. 403 U.S. at 289-90. See also B rotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Ter­
minal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 390-93 (1969). 
23. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 ( 1970). 
24. Justice 'White relied on this point to support his contention that there should 
be no preemption simply on the claim of "arguably protected." See his dissent in Lock­
ridge. 403 U.S. at 325-32. and his concurring opinion in Ariadne, 397 U.S. at 201 .  
25. 325 U.S. 538 ( 1945). 
26. See note 11 supra. 
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state, the Court would strike it down-without any talk about exclusive NLRB 
competence, impracticability of Supreme Court review, or conduct "arguably 
protected"-on the ground that, although the state court had jurisdiction over 
a case based on the violation of state law, that law was an "actual," not an 
"arguable," infringement of federally protected rights.27 Such a case, in which 
the Court decides what is federally protected, is a far cry from the use of 
"arguably protected" to exclude the plaintiff from any forum in which he may 
seek to establish that the conduct is in fact not protected. If an acceptable basis 
for so excluding him is to be found, it would be better to search for it un­
encumbered by the deceptive appeal of resort to section 7. 
B. ((Prohibited}} or ((Arguably Prohibited}}: The Relevance of Section 8 
The remaining aspects of the traditional primary-jurisdiction aphorism 
are no more compelling on initial critical examination than the "arguably pro­
tected" element. As to "prohibited" acts, it is of course clear that only the 
NLRB may enforce the unfair practice provisions of the Act. A state-court 
plaintiff, however, relies on a state-created cause of action, and it is not imme­
diately apparent why the existence of a similar wrong under section 8 of the 
federal law should displace state law. To speak of the "arguably prohibited" 
quality of conduct as grounds for preemption implies that, if the challenged 
acts are "actually" prohibited, they may be redressed by the NLRB, and that 
therefore plaintiff must seek adjudication there. This implication leads to the 
absurd spectacle of a union defendant, charged with violations of state law, 
defending on the ground that it has violated federal law as well, while the 
employer rebuts by earnestly asserting the complete propriety of the union's 
acts under federal standards. Furthermore, the obverse of the implication is 
false, for-to come to the final theme in the primary-jurisdiction rubric-the 
notion that there is no preemption if unprotected conduct is also not pro­
hibited is simply not the law. The decision in Teamsters Local 20 v. M orton28 
is squarely dispositive of the point that the inquiry is not so easily set to rest: 
[E] ven though it may be assumed that at least some of the secondary 
activity here involved was neither protected nor prohibited, it is still 
necessary to determine whether by enacting § 303, "Congress occu­
pied this field and closed it to state regulation." . . . The basic 
question . . .  is whether "in a case such as this, incompatible doctrines 
of local law must give way to principles of federal labor law . . . .  "
The answer to that question ultimately depends upon whether the 
application of state law in this kind of case would operate to frustrate 
the purpose of the federal legislation.29 
27. E.g., Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees, Div. 1287 v. Missouri, 374 U.S. 
74 (1963); Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees, Div. 998 v. \Visconsin Employment 
Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 383 ( 195 1) ; International Union, UAW v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 
454 (1950). 
28. 377 U. S. 252 ( 1964). 
29. Id. at 258. See also Hanna Mining Co. v. Marine Eng'rs Benevolent Ass'n, 382 
U. S. 181, 187, 189 (1965). 
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I believe, however, that the instant questions-why state power should be 
preempted where conduct is prohibited or is arguably prohibited-are per­
tinent ones. I will attempt in what follows to suggest the contours of answers 
that, in my judgment, do lend strong support to what the Supreme Court has 
done, and much of what it has said, in this field. 
1. Federally Prohibited Conduct. It is difficult to find non-conclusory, 
non-metaphoric discussions of the reasons that the existence of section 8 viola­
tions-redressable, to be sure, only through federal administrative proceedings 
-should displace state-created causes of action embodying identical condemna­
tions. Justice Jackson spoke to this issue in an oft-cited passage in Garner v. 
Teamsters Local 776: 
Congress did not merely lay down a substantive rule of law to 
be enforced by any tribunal competent to apply law generally to the 
parties. It went on to confide primary interpretation and application 
of its rules to a specific and specially constituted tribunal and pre­
scribed a particular procedure for investigation, complaint and notice, 
and hearing and decision, including judicial relief pending a final 
administrative order. Congress evidently considered that centralized 
administration of specially designed procedures was necessary to ob­
tain uniform application of its substantive rules and to avoid these 
diversities and conflicts likely to result from a variety of local proce­
dures and attitudes toward labor controversies .. . .  A multiplicity of 
tribunals and a diversity of procedures are quite as apt to produce 
incompatible or conflicting adjudications as are different rules of 
substantive law. The same reasoning which prohibits federal courts 
from intervening in such cases, except by way of review or on appli­
cation of the federal Board, precludes state courts from doing so.3 0 
It is worth noting that Justice Jackson was addressing himself to the question 
why state courts were not given concurrent jurisdiction to apply federal law, 
thus assuming, presumably, that the underlying state law was displaced by 
the mere enactment of federal substantive regulation. In Lockridge, Mr. 
Justice Harlan, after quoting from this portion of Garner, added his own 
perceptions: 
Conflict in technique can be fully as disruptive to the system Con­
gress erected as conflict in overt policy. As the passage from Garner 
indicates, in matters of dispute concerning labor relations a simple 
recitation of the formally prescribed rights and duties of the parties 
constitutes an inadequate description of the actual process for settle­
ment Congress has provided. The technique of administration and the 
range and nature of those remedies that are and are not available 
is a fundamental part and parcel of the operative legal system estab­
lished bv the National Labor Relations Act .... The rationale for 
preemption, then, rests in large measure upon our determination that 
'.vhen it set clown a federal labor policy Congress plainly meant to 
do more than simply to alter the then prevailing substantive law. 
It sought as well to restructure fundamentally the processes for ef-
30. 346 U.S. 485, 490-91 (1953). 
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fectuating that policy, deliberately placing the responsibility for apply­
ing and developing this comprehensive legal system in the hands of 
an expert administrative body rather than the federalized judicial 
system. Thus, that a local court, while adjudicating a labor dispute 
also within the jurisdiction of the NLRB, may purport to apply legal 
rules identical to those prescribed in the federal Act or may eschew 
the authority to define or apply principles specifically developed to 
regulate labor relations does not mean that all relevant potential for 
debilitating conflict is absent.31 
Justice Harlan's analysis leads one to recall more precisely what Congress 
did when it defined specific conduct as an unfair labor practice. It "outlawed" 
the conduct, to be sure, and authorized the Board to "prevent any person" 
from engaging in it ;32 in so doing, however, it hedged that substantive judg­
ment with many critical procedural decisions. Thus, there is no private right 
of action whatever and aggrieved individuals must bear the burden of per­
suading a public official to seek redress ;33 action must be sought within the 
unusually short six-months limitation period ;34 the nagging problem of equi­
table relief pendente lite is made the subject of specific, complex regulation ;35 
fact-finding is placed in the hands of an administrative body, subject to limited 
judicial review ;36 and remedies, for the most part equitable and prospective, 
are subject to the broad remedial discretion given the NLRB under a 
vague statutory criterion.37 It was under these conditions that Congress pro­
scribed certain practices and if, �s the-·Garne;::-and Lockridge p���ages suggest, 
they were deemed of the essence of the legislative decision to act, the assump­
tion is that all enforcement machinery should function in full conformity to 
the regime constructed by Congress. State law, then, can never be said merely 
to parallel the federal act, for the enforcement apparatus is by hypothesis 
exclusively federal. 
The evolution of the Court's response to the question of the availability 
of state remedies for conduct violative of both federal and state law illustrates 
this point. In United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp.,38 Inter­
national Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales39 and International Union, UAW v. 
31. 403 U.S. at 287-88 (footnote omitted). 
32. "The Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any person from 
engaging in any unfair labor practice .... " 29 U.S. C. § 160(a) (1970). 
33. 29 U. S.C. §§153(c), 160 (1970). 
34. 29 u.s.c. § 160(b) (1970). 
35. Section 10(!) of the NLRA, 29 U. S. C. § 160(!) (1970), does not permit private­
party access to preliminary injunctive relief, but requires the General Counsel of the 
Board to seek preliminary relief once he has decided to proceed with the case. At the 
same time, the ultimate discretion of the district court to make such orders respecting 
the grant or denial of injunctive relief "as it deems just and proper" with procedural 
safeguards relating to notice and hearing, is preserved. I d. 
' 
36. 29 U.S. C. §§ 160(c), (e), (f) (1970). 
37. 29 U. S. C. § 160(c) (1970). (The Board may require the respondent to take "such 
affirmative action ... as will effectuate the policies of this Act .. . "). 
38. 347 u.s. 656 (1954). 
39. 356 u.s. 617 ( 1958). 
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Russell,40 the Court permitted the recovery of both compensatory and punitive 
damages for conduct actionable under state law. The fact that the conduct 
violated the NLRA was deemed evidence "of congressional disapproval . . . in­
consistent with immunization from liability for damages . . . . ;"41 the Court 
thus found no indication that the discretion granted the NLRB to award 
back pay was intended "to constitute an exclusive pattern of money damages 
for private injuries."42 Instead, the Justices characterized lost pay (the limit of 
financial recompense obtainable from the Board) as merely "partial relief", 
which the states could supplement. 43 
Chief Justice Warren strongly dissented from this view of the effect of 
federal law: 
Even if we assume that the Board had no authority to award respon­
dent back pay in the circumstances of this case, the existence of such 
a gap in the remedial scheme of federal legislation is no license for 
the States to fashion correctives .. . .  The Federal Act represents an 
attempt to balance the competing interests of employee, union and 
management. By providing additional remedies the States may upset 
that balance as effectively as by frustrating or duplicating existing 
ones. 44 
It is the Chief Justice's analysis that has prevailed. The unavailability of par­
ticular remedial measures is now perceived, not as a gap or failing which a 
state may fill or redress, but as a conscious congressional judgment, creating 
a balance which state "supplementation" may not upset. 45 Thus the emphasis, 
in examining the availability of a given remedy from the Board as a ground 
for preemption, is on the likelihood, not that the NLRB can provide the 
remedy in question, but that it cannot. 
2. Arguably Prohibited Conduct. As the foregoing strongly suggests, the 
most illuminating area of inquiry is "arguably prohibited" conduct. Here too, 
my contention is that preemption does not flow from the possibility that con­
duct arguably prohibited may be actually prohibited-and therefore actionable 
before the Board, and only before the Board; the case for preemption rests 
rather on the prospect that arguably prohibited conduct may be actually not 
prohibited-and therefore intended to be free of all legal restraint, state as 
well as federal. 
It is curious that this point has been so dimly perceived, for the Court 
40. 356 U.S. 634 (1958). 
41. 347 U.S. at 666-67. 
42. 356 U.S. at 645. 
43. 356 U.S. at 621. 
44. International Union, UA W v. Russell, 356 U.S. at 650. See also nis dissent in 
International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 623 (1958). 
45. See Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 288-89 
n.5 (1971), specifically condemning "disparities in the reactions of the States to �nlavvful 
union behavior."; Teamsters Local 20 v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 260-61 (1964). 
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had said as much as early as 1953. The Garner decision prohibited a state 
from enjoining minority-union picketing for recognition, on the ground that 
federal unfair labor practices dealt-albeit only partially-with union pressure 
on the self-organizational rights of employees. Justice Jackson's analysis bears 
recalling: 
The detailed prescription of a procedure for restraint of specified 
types of picketing would seem to imply that other picketing is to be 
free of other methods and sources of restraint. For the policy of the 
national Labor Management Relations Act is not to condemn all 
picketing but only that ascertained by its prescribed processes to fall 
within its prohibitions. Otherwise, it is implicit in the Act that the 
public interest is served by freedom of labor to use the weapon of 
picketing. For a state to impinge on the area of labor combat de­
signed to be free is quite as much an obstruction of federal policy 
as if the state were to declare picketing free for purposes or by 
methods which the federal Act prohibits.46 
This approach finds in the failure of Congress to prohibit certain conduct a 
warrant for the negative inference that it was deemed proper, indeed desirable 
-at least, desirable to be left for the free play of contending economic forces. 
Thus, the state is not merely filling a gap when it outlaws what federal law 
fails to outlaw; it is denying one party to an economic contest a weapon that 
Congress meant him to have available. 
3. The "Negative Inference'' Rationale. One can see how such an inter­
pretation, combined with similar views regarding the enforcement and reme­
dial design of the Act,47 might lead one to characterize the Taft-Hartley 
amendments as labor's Magna Carta, for the significance of the restraints 
actually embodied in the section 8(b) prohibitions pales when set in the con­
text of a perceived legislative commitment to the free use of economic weapons 
not actually proscribed. It is not surprising, recalling the nation's contem­
poraneous perception of Taft-Hartley, that, despite Garner, the period should 
have been marked by quite different judicial interpretations as well.48 Never-
46. 346 U.S. at 499-500. 
47. See text accompanying notes 30-45 supra. 
48. Consider, in addition to the "remedies" decisions previously discussed, see text 
accompanying notes 38-43 supra, two cases decided in 1949. In International Union, UA W 
v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245 ( 1949) (Briggs-Stratton), the 
Court upheld state power to enjoin intermittent work stoppages. This decision is the 
origin of the principle that, where conduct is "neither protected nor prohibited," there is 
a regulatory void which the state may fill. "This conduct is governable by the State 
or it is entirely ungoverned." I d. at 254. However, on the "not prohibited" side, the 
Court did not simply note that the unfair labor practice provisions failed to cover the 
challenged conduct, but made the point that there was no provision that seemed even to 
speak to the problem. "(N]o proceeding is authorized by which the Federal Board may 
deal with it in any manner." ld. at 253. This decision predated the attempt by the 
Eisenhower Board to find such a provision in section 8 (b) ( 3), requiring unions to bargain 
in good faith, see NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960) ; today 
the case would doubtless be viewed differently. Cf. note 53 infra. 
Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd. 336 U.S. 
301 (1949), upheld a state law permitting union-security agreements only by a 
'
two-thirds 
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theless, it has become increasingly clear that the failure of section 8 to outlaw 
certain conduct raises the question whether Congress thereby legitimized it, 
and that the answer to the question will often be in the affirmative. Again the 
J.11 art on decision is squarely on point. Ohio law was held precluded from 
interfering with noncoercive appeals to secondary employers to boycott a 
struck company: 
In this case, the petitioner's request to Launder's management to 
cease doing business with the respondent was not proscribed by the 
Act. " [A] union is free to approach an employer to persuade him 
to engage in a boycot, so long as it refrains from the specifically pro­
hibited means of coercion through inducement of employees." Car­
penters Local 1976 v. Labor Board, . . . 357 U.S. at 99. This weapon 
of self-help, permitted by federal law, formed an integral part of the 
petitioner's effort to achieve its bargaining goals during negotiations 
with the respondent. Allowing its use is a part of the balance struck 
by Congress between the conflicting interests of the union, the em­
ployees, the employer and the community .... If the Ohio law of 
secondary boycott can be applied to proscribe the same type of con­
duct which Congress focused upon but did not proscribe when it 
enacted § 303, the inevitable result would be to frustrate the con­
gressional determination to leave this weapon of self-help available, 
and to upset the balance of povver between labor and management 
expressed in our national labor policy.49 
Lockridge in effect reaffirms this view,50 which is plainly consonant with 
the realities of the legislative process as it has dealt with the economic weapons 
available to labor and management. Consider, for example, the reach of 
section 8 (b) ( 4) 51 as affected by the primary-secondary dichotomy or the 
consumer-publicity proviso; or the status under section 8(b) (7) 52 of pre­
election picketing during an organizational campaign which the employer is 
vigorously (perhaps unlawfully) opposing: Is it not apparent that, if one 
vote of the employees. Justice Frankfurter, for the Court, squarely rejected the nega­
tive-inference approach: 
It is argued, therefore, that a State cannot forbid what § 8(3) affirmatively per­
mits. The short answer is that § 8 ( 3) merely disclaims a national policy hostile 
to the closed shop or other forms of union-security agreement. 
I d. at 307. He relied on specific legislative history from the 1935 debates to support his 
view, and it is important to recall that he was here holding only that the Wagner Act 
contained no preclusion of state regulation of union security. Federal restrictions on 
union-security agreements had been placed in the 1935 Act only to restrain employers 
from preempting genuinely independent organizing efforts; the legislature had not faced 
at all their propriety as a union weapon. The Taft-Hartley amendments would have 
changed all that, and given rise to a strong "negative inference" argument, were it not 
for the express disclaimer in section 14 (b). See 336 U.S. at 313-14; note 50 infra. 
49. Teamsters Local 20 v. Morton, 377 U.S. at 259-60. See also the Court's formula­
tion of the issue in Hanna Mining Co. v. Marine Eng'rs Benevolent Ass'n, 382 U.S. 181, 
189 (1965), where, however, the answer was different, see text accompanying notes 56-
59 infra. 
50. Indeed its holding amounts to a decision sub silentio that Algoma Plywood 
discussed in note 48 snpra, lost its validity with the passage of the Taft-Hartley amend� 
ments, except in "right to work" states under section 14 (b). 
51. 29 U.S.C. § 158(4) (1970). 
52. 29 u.s.c. § 158(7) (1970). 
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concludes that certain conduct does not violate either of those incredibly 
complex provisions, he is not asserting that it is "unregulated" by federal 
law? The premise is rather that Congress judged whether the conduct \vas 
illicit or legitimate, and that "legitimate" connotes, not simply that federal 
law is neutral, but that the conduct is to be assimilated to the large residual 
area in which a regime of free collective bargaining-"economic warfare," 
if you prefer-is thought to be the course of regulatory wisdom.53 
By this analysis, a negative inference, that conduct not prohibited is 
"designed to be free," would ordinarily be warranted. The crucial issue is 
whether it is not warranted in any particular instance. Section 14(b) embodies 
the unique case of specific legislative rejection of the negative inference. 
In Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. Schermerhorn,54 the Court upheld a state's 
power to apply its own law against union-security agreements lawful under 
federal law, and to enforce state law in state court, despite some textual 
warrant for reading the provision to make enforcement of a union-shop 
agreement in a "right to work" state a federal unfair labor practice.55 Another 
exception was dealt with in Hanna Mining Co. v. Marine Eng'rs Benevolent 
Ass'n,56 which upheld the right of a state court to enjoin recognition picketing 
by a minority union comprised of supervisory workers. Supervisors are ex-
53. It is in this sense that one may speak of the use of economic weapons as "pro­
tected" under the federal Act. However, the thought meant to be conveyed is importantly 
different from the connotation which "protected activity" has under section 7. See text 
accompanying notes 25-27 supra. It is misleading, as well as conclusory, to employ the 
term in determining the effect of federal law on state restrictions of union or employer 
economic weapons. 
The analysis set forth in the text is intellectually nourished by those decisions which, 
in construing the unfair-labor-practice provisions of the Act, emphasized the national 
commitment to free collective bargaining and the legislative reluctance to entrust to the 
Board or the courts wide discretion to judge the desirability of particular labor-manage­
ment economic weapons. See American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 316-18 
(1965) (lockouts); Teamsters Local 357 v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667, 676 (1961) (hiring 
halls); NLRB v. Teamsters Local 639, 362 U.S. 274, 284 (1960) (recognition picket­
ing); NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 500 (1960) (bargaining 
tactics); Local 1976, Carpenters v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93, 99-100 (1958) (hot cargo agree­
ments); cf. Local 1424, Machinists v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 411, 428-29 (1960) (statute of 
limitations). These decisions provided the perspective from which cases such as M orion 
drew preemptive inferences from congressional "failure" to prohibit. See also Justice 
Harlan's analysis in Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 
u.s. 369 (1969). 
54. 375 u.s. 96 (1963). 
55. See id. at 103. Section 14(b) states that the Act (referring in particular to the 
proviso to section 8 (a) ( 3)) shall not "be construed as authorizing" enforcement of 
union-security agreements contrary to state law. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1970). Such en­
forcement would be in violation of sections 8(a) (3) and 8(b) (2), on which a complaint 
to the NLRB could be based. 
The Lockridge opinions do not discuss section 14 (b), presumably because Idaho is 
not a "right to work" state. But the statute does not require a formal state enactment 
prohibiting union security, wholly or subject to certain conditions; it forbids broadly the 
"execution or application" of union-security agreements where prohibited by state law. 
See Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. \Visconsin Employment Relations Bd. 336 U. S. 
301, 314 (1949). One must inquire why the rule of decision applied by the Id�ho courts 
in Lockridge was not deemed such a prohibition. Is "state law" to be read to exclude 
judge-made law? Is there ground for questioning, and is it relevant to question the prior 
existence of the "law" invoked in the Lockridge litigation? 
' 
56. 382 u.s. 181 ( 1965). 
1972] PREEMPTION 481 
eluded from the statutory definition of "employee," and as a result of the 
interlacing definitions their union is not a "labor organization" within the 
meaning of the Act ; accordingly, what would otherwise clearly violate section 
8(b) (7) is "not prohibited" by the NLRA.57 " [T] he question arises," 
Justice Harlan noted for the Court, "whether Congress nonetheless desired 
that in their peaceful facets these efforts remain free from state regulation 
as well as Board authority" ;58 the Court saw in the legislative history sur­
rounding the decision to exempt supervisors from employee status no warrant 
for answering the question in the affirmative.59 The case is significant, not so 
much for the particularities of that answer, as for the process of decision 
it illustrates and the consistency of its basic approach with that suggested in 
Morton.60 
III . CON CLUSIONS 
A. The "Exceptions" to Preemption 
Justice White, dissenting in Lockridge, approached the preemption ques­
tion conscious, not only of the difficulties with the "primary jurisdiction" 
rationale of Garmon,61 but also of the many circumstances in which the 
Court had permitted state law to operate in the field. "To summarize," he 
observed, "the 'rule' of uniformity that the Court invokes today is at best a 
tattered one, and at worst little more than a myth. "62 In support, he adduced 
the following: enforcement of collective bargaining agreements under section 
301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act,63 whether in a judicial or 
arbitral forum ; the duty of fair representation, where relevant to enforcement 
of employee's claim under the collective agreement ; damage actions for un­
lawful secondary boycotts under section 303 ;64 violence ; defamation ; and 
union internal affairs. 
It is of interest to note that most of these "exceptions" are limitations 
on the pervasive exclusivity of NLRB jurisdiction, but deal with situations 
nonetheless governed by federal law ; thus, the inconsistency is substantially 
57. See 29 U.S.C. § §  152(3), (5) ( 1970) ; Marine Eng'rs Benevolent Ass'n v. In-
terlake S.S. Co., 370 U.S. 173 ( 1 962). 
58. 382 U.S. at 189. 
59. I d. at 1 89-90. 
60. I do not believe that Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, Local 114, 383 U.S. 
53 ( 1966), partially upholding state defamation suits, is inconsistent with this analysis 
although the tone of the opinion is somewhat so. "The malicious publication of l ibelou� 
statements does not in and of itself constitute an unfair labor practice " id. at 63 not 
because Congress deemed such conduct legitimate, but because it sought ' to regulate
' 
only 
coercive or misleading speech, and was not addressing itself to injury to reputation. "The 
injury that [ a  defamatory) statement might cause to an individual's reputation-whether 
he be an employer or union official-has no relevance to the Board's function." Id. See 
note 66 infra. 
61. See note 24 supra. 
62. 403 U.S. at 318. 
63. 29 u.s.c. § 185 (1970) .  
64. 29 u.s.c. § 187 (1970). 
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lessened if one discards, as I have suggested, the primary j urisdiction of the 
Board as the basis for preemption. I do not mean to indicate that none of these 
areas would profit from judicial or legislative reexamination, 65 but they hardly 
render the concerns and premises of Garmon and Lockridge a "myth."66 
B. The Need for Improved Access to Federal Re1nedies 
vVhen all is said and done, however, one cannot leave an approvmg 
discussion of Lockridge without acknowledging that an injustice was done ; 
Lockridge and others were discharged, in all probability unlawfully, and 
received neither recovery nor a genuine opportunity to prove their case. The 
65. Section 301 is the most complex area, but in retrospect one can hardly assert with 
confidence that an alternate road to that marked out by the Court would have been 
preferable. Congress itself made the conscious decision to entrust enforcement of the 
agreement to the courts rather than to the Board, and the Supreme Court surely could 
not have been expected to hold that federal j udicial jurisdiction is exclusive. Charles 
Dmvd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962 ) .  It has wholly federalized the governing 
substantive law, Teamsters Local 1 74 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 ( 1962 ) ,  and its 
decision not to hold j udicial j urisdiction preempted by the existence of potential unfair 
labor practices in the facts of a breach-of-contract claim, Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 
371 U.S. 195 ( 1962 ) ,  seems a wise one. Surely it creates problems in some circumstances, 
but the other view would hardly have done less, and in any event the issue is quite distinct 
from that involved in the typical preemption case such as Garm on. There may be stronger 
grounds for questioning the wisdom of Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U. S. 1 7 1  ( 1 967 ) ,  which eagerly 
authorized section 301 suits against unions-as well as against employers-for breach of 
the duty of fair representation when a claim based on the agreement is involved. But the 
area is fiendishly complex, and no course would have eliminated overlapping forums and 
elusive distinctions. 
I believe, however, that the totally free rein given state courts to deal with "violence" 
will not bear Supreme Court reexamination. As Justice White accurately observed in 
Lockridge : 
[ I ]  t is entirely possible that some States will require a greater showing of violence 
than others before awarding damages, so that behavior which violently seeks to 
coerce union membership will be prohibited in one State and allowed in another. 
But the interest in uniformity is subordinated to the larger interests that persons 
inj ured by such violence be preserved whatever remedies state law may authorize. 
403 U.S. at 3 1 8. It seems clear that federal law should speak at least minimally to three 
problems : the line between peaceful and violent conduct, as to which wide variations in 
local. treatment are common ; basic procedural safeguards in the fact-finding process, par­
ticularly in inj unction cases ; and some guidelines or outer limits on the availability of 
punitive damages. Under any analysis, it  is impossible to j ustify the total abdication of 
any federal supervision over these matters (compare the treatment of defamation, note 66 
infra), but the Supreme Court has shown no eagerness to speak to the question. Taggart 
v. Weinacker's, Inc., 397 U.S. 223 (1970 ) ,  see note 1 1  supra, raised some aspects of it, 
but the Court declined to decide the merits of the case. 
66. The area of defamation deserves a word. Because the Court split so closely and 
so sharply on whether to preclude entirely state-created defamation suits, Linn v. United 
Plant Guard Workers, Local 1 14, 383 U.S. 53 ( 1966 ) ,  it is easy to read more than i s  
warranted into the majority's refusal to  go  so  far. Linn most assuredly did not hold that 
state defamation actions were "exceptions" to preemption, and therefore not matters of 
federal concern. The Court held that federal law, derived from a concern "that the 
recognition of legitimate state interests . . .  not interfere with effective administration of 
national labor policy . . .  ," id. at 64, set the outer limits of permissible resort to state 
defamation law. Two specific federal conditions-proof of malice in fact and of actual 
damages-were announced ; a third, restriction of the types of defamation that could be 
made actionable, was rej ected on policy grounds ; and the Court specifically reserved the 
question whether experience might warrant further limitation. Again the case reflects 
lessened concern over the primary j urisdiction of the NLRB, but as a 
'
substantive matter 
the inroads made by Linn are quite substantial ; indeed, it  would be a very rare case which 
would be worth litigating under it. 
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weaknesses 111  our legal regime that the case exposes are not, however, in 
the preemption of state law ; with all respect, I have great difficulty perceiving 
the relevance of much of Justice ·white's discussion to the case there at 
hand.67 The weaknesses involve rather the adequacy of access to the federal 
enforcement machinery, the exclusivity of which was so forcibly brought home 
to Lockridge. 
The statute of limitations is unconscionably short as applied to cases 
where neither union nor employer is likely to file a charge.68 It should be 
changed, but even an academic recognizes the futility of further discussion 
of that issue. However, the "law" governing regional-director and general­
counsel decisions not to issue a complaint is another matter. The point is 
not that there is no judicial review of refusals to proceed, for to grant review 
would open the courts to a deluge of unnecessary litigation.69 What is 
needlessly unjust is the almost total failure to provide basic procedural 
safeguards to assist the charging party-or one not represented by a labor 
lawyer who "knows the ropes"-in making his case, and to regularize and 
channel the discretion of the regional director and general counsel. Surely 
the Board can provide some definition of the hearing (or conference )  rights 
to be accorded charging parties, and require some genuinely meaningful dis­
closure of the reasons supporting a refusal to proceed-not the form recitals 
so often encountered70-by the regional director or (were protection prior to 
his decision deemed warranted) by staff counsel recommending dismissal. 
The Supreme Court can perhaps prod the NLRB to take some remedial 
measures in this area, although it may find inadequate legislative warrant for 
doing so. No such reticence need affect the Administrative Conference or the 
Section of Labor Relations Law of the American Bar Association. Indeed, 
since the NLRB could readily embody any proposals coming from such 
sources in its own rules, it is apparent that it need not even await action or 
study by public or private groups, for the Board's rulemaking procedures 
provide a fully adequate basis for bringing informed opinion to bear on the 
question. 
67. See Justice Harlan's expression of similar difficulty, 403 U.S. at 290 n.6 ; cf. id. 
at 288-89 n .S .  
68. There is  a strong argument that the limitations bar to federal unfair-labor-practice 
charges should preclude resort to a state-created right of action as well, since Congress' 
purpose in p rescribing a short period in which a charge could be filed was to give sub­
stantial weight to the interest in stability. See Local 1424, IAM v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 41 1 
( 1960) ; cf. text accompanying notes 3 1-37 supra. A passage in Garm on, to the effect 
that state law remains preempted despite inability to obtain federal relief when the dis­
missal of a Board charge lacks "unclouded legal significance," 359 U.S. at 246, may be 
read to support this result, albeit on primary-jurisdiction grounds. 
69. As Justice Douglas pointed out, dissenting in Lockridge, the Supreme Court has 
never squarely passed on the unreviewability rule, and the reaffirmation of Garmon may 
lead to a break in that position. See 403 U.S. at 305 n.2. 
70. As, for example, in the dispute out of which Lockridge arose. See text accompany­
ing note 16 supra. 
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C. The Future of Lockridge 
Lockridge asked whether Gannon still lived ; we must ask now whether 
Lockridge will survive. Justice Harlan closed his opinion in that case with 
these compellingly pertinent thoughts: 
While we do not assert that the Garmon doctrine is without imper­
fection, we do think that it is founded on reasoned principle and that 
until it is altered by congressional action or by judicial insights that 
are born of further experience with it, a heavy burden rests upon 
those who would, at this late date, ask this Court to abandon Garmon 
and set out again in quest of a system more nearly perfect. A fair 
regard for considerations of stare decisis and the coordinate role of 
the Congress in defining the extent to which federal legislation pre­
empts state law strongly supports our conclusion that the basic tenets 
of Gannon should not be disturbed.7 1 
As I write these words, the author of those I have quoted lies near 
death,72 and another of the 5-man Lockridge majority is already gone. Justice 
Harlan's admonition was not merely the marshalling of a debater's point. 
He wrote for the minority in Garmon, and became the chief expositor of its 
rationale, restating its underpinnings in far more tenable fashion than did 
its author. His words, and his career, remind us how debased is much of the 
recent talk about "judicial conservatism" and "strict construction." 
Service on the Supreme Court gives a man or woman a unique oppor­
tunity to discover his true perception of this country, and of the Court's role 
in its evolution; one hopes that those who follow Justice Harlan will find 
in his concepts of the judicial function a more enduring guide than thoughts 
spoken into the political winds would suggest. On the realization of that hope 
depends far more than the future of the preemption doctrine. 
7 1 .  403 U.S. at 302. 
72. Justice Harlan died on December 30, 1971. 
